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!Ehe Lewis Flight Propulsion Laboratory of the Rationd Advisory Com- 
mittee for Aexozl~butics proposes t o  build a zero power research reactor 
faci l i ty  which wiU be loca%ed i n  the laboratory grounds near Clevelaurd, 
Ohio. The purpose of t h i s  report i s  t o  i e o m  the Advisory Ccamnittee on 
Reactor Safeguaxds of the U. S. Atomic Energy C ~ s s i o n  in  regard to  the 
design of the reactor facility, the cha,racteristics of the site, and the 
hazards of operation a t  this location, 
The purgose of this  reactor is  to  perform cr i t ical  experiments, t o  
measuxe reactivity effects, t o  serve as a neutron source, and t o  serve as 
a training tool. 
The reacwr faci l i ty  is  described. This i s  followed by a discussion 
of the nuclear characteristics and the control system. Site characteris- 
t i c s  are then discussed followed by a discussion of the experiments which 
may be conducted in  the facility. The potential. hazards of the faci l i ty  
are then considered, particularly, the rnax&nm credible accident. Finally, 
the administrative grocedure is  discussed. 
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NACA ZERO POWW REACTCW FACILITY HAZARlCYj SMURY 
A zero power nuclear reactor is an essential part of the nuclear 
program of the National Advisory Committee fo r  Aeranautics. The uses 
fo r  such a reactor are many: 
1. To perform experiments fo r  obtaining the c r i t i c a l  dimensions, 
flux distributions, and var iuus hunogeneaus coef f i c  ient s of react iv- 
i t y  fo r  both reflected and unreflected assemblies. 
2. To provide a research tool  f o r  measuring reactivity effects 
of voids, moderators, fuels, and absorbers, and fo r  measuring flux 
distributions near these inhceaogeniet ies  . 
3. To serve as a neutron source f o r  detection and activation 
experiments, and t o  provide neutron beams for  nuclear interaction 
experiments and fo r  measuremnts of diffusiau and slowing down 
parameters in various media. 
4. To serve as a training tool  both fo r  personnel taking formal 
nuclear engineering courses in the NACA research divisions, and fo r  
personnel being trained fo r  the NACA Reactor Facil i ty at Pluuibrook 
Ordnance Works in Ohio. 
A hcmogenems reactor using uranyl fluoride ( U O ~ F ~  )-water solut ions 
has been selected. This solution-type reactor is one of demonstrated re- 
l i ab i l i t y  and sound technology (refs . 1.1 and 1.2) . The safety charac- 
t e r i s t i c s  of these reactors are excellent (ref .  1.3) . They possess Urge 
negative temperature and radiolytic gas coefficients of reactivity, and 
so l i m i t  the severity of accidental power excursions. Furthermore, the 
relat ive s m l i c i t y  of operation, and application of the reactor t o  the 
requirements mentioned above, make the solution-type reactor ideally 
suited. 
The reactors w i l l  be cylindrical, reflected or unreflected assem- 
blies,  in  which the fuel  concentration may vary from assembly t o  assem- 
bly, and a re  essentially similar t o  the Oak Ridge assemblies (ref .  1.4). 
The f ac i l i t y  is designed for  steady-state reactor operation a t  a maximum 
total. power of 10 watts, producing average thermal neutron fluxes up t o  
10' neutrons/(cm2) (sec ) . 
The description of the reactor f ac i l i t y  and the discussion of the 
hazards associated with it are organized i n  the following manner. Sec- 
t ion 2 contains a description of the f ac i l i t y  including deta i ls  of the 
fuel  system, the control system, and the reactor physics associated with 
certain families of loadings. Section 3 discusses the s i t e ,  section 4 
the kinds of experiments being considered fo r  the reactor, section 5 the 
hazards including those associated with the maximum credible accident , 
and section 6 the administrative procedures. 
1.1 References 
1.1 King, L. D. P.: Design and Descripti.on of Water Boiler Reactors. 
International Conference caz the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, 
vol . 2, paper ~ / 4 8 8  (1955) . 
1.2 Research Reactors, chapter 1, TID 5275 (1955) . 
1.3 %trick, D. L., e t  a l . :  Preliminary Results on the Kinetic Behavior 
of Water Boiler Reactors. NU-SR-1896 (1957). 
1.4 Csllihan, A. D.,  Morfitt, J. W., and Thomas, J. T. : S m l l  Thermal 
Homogeneous Cri t ica l  Assemblies. International Conference on the 
Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, vol. V, paper ~/834 (1955). 
2. ' I T E  REACTCIR FACILITY 
2.1 General Description of Facil i ty 
This section presents a general description of the proposed NACA 
Zero Power Reactor Facility. 
2.1.1 Si te .  - The reactor f ac i l i t y  w i l l  be located a t  the Lewis 
Flight Propulsion Laboratory of the NACA adjacent t o  the Cleveland Hop- 
kins Airport, Cleveland, Ohio. A description of the s i t e  is contained 
in section 3. 
2.1.2 Reactor. - The reactor w i l l  be of the homogeneous type. Dif- 
ferent core configurations w i l l  be used a t  different times. The cores 
w i l l  consist of solutions of highly enriched uranyl fluoride ( ~ 0 . 9 ~ )  in
l ight  water. The reactor may be bare or reflected. The reactor w i l l  be 
of cylindrical geometry with the top open t o  the atmosphere. 
The reactor w i l l  ordinarily be run a t  a power level of approximately 
1/10 watt with a maximum of ten watts. 
I n i t i a l  experiments w i l l  be performed with a $eactor of hydrogen - 
uranium ra t i o  of 500, and length - diameter ra t io  of 2.  This particular 
reactor has a diameter of 29.5 cm and a height of approximately 59 cm. 
2.1.3 Reactor control. - Reactor control during normal operat ion 
w i l l  be effected by control of the quantity of solution in the reactor 
vessel. 
One control rod w i l l  be installed. This rod ' w i l l  be a safety rod 
only, and w i l l  not be used for  regulation. There w i l l  be no provision 
for  incremental positioning of t h i s  safety rod. In addition t o  the safety 
rod, provisions have been made t o  dump the reactor core solution into 
storage tanks with a "safe geometry" when an unsafe condition occurs. 
A discussion of reactor control is contained in section 2.4. 
2.1.4 Building. - The reactor building is an addition t o  the exist- 
ing Materials and Stresses building a t  the Lewis laboratory. Figures 2.1 
and 2.2 show a floor plan and section of the reactor building. The reac- 
t o r  building is a reinforced concrete underground structure consisting of 
a reactor room 20 feet  by 32 feet  by 20 feet  in height, a solution room 
15 by 21 feet  by 10 feet  in height, a personnel decontamination and locker 
room, and a corridor. Ad joining space in  the  basement of the exis t ing 
Materials and Stresses building w i l l  be u t i l i zed  f o r  a control room. 
Access t o  the  f a c i l i t y  w i l l  be through the control room only; the 
corridor door w i l l  normally be locked. The control room door w i l l  have 
a lock and admittance w i l l  be limited t o  authorized personnel. 
A platform 9 f ee t  in height w i l l  support the reactor and associated 
equipment approximately midway between f loor  and cei l ing of the reactor 
roam. The f loors  of the  reactor room and solution room w i l l  be covered 
with a s tainless-st& sheet forming a pan appraximately 6 inches in  
depth t o  contain any spi l lage.  The f loor  levels  of these two roams is 
6 inches below the general f loor  level .  Walls and ceilings in these 
rooms w i l l  be protected with a strippable waterproof p la s t i c  coating t o  
prevent contamination of the concrete in  the  event of an excursion. 
2.1.5 Shielding. - The shielding i s  designed so tha t  no person w i l l  
receive a dose in excess of 1 millirem/hour when the reactor is operating 
at 10 w a t t s  power. 
The reactor room w i l l  be isolated from the r e s t  of the  building dur- 
ing operation by a gas t i g h t  door a t  the end of the corridor (see f i g .  
2.1). This w i l l  prevent radioactive gases or  vapors from contaminating 
other parts  of the  building. A n  interlock w i l l  prevent f i l l i n g  of the 
reactor i f  t h i s  door is not closed. 
Operating personnel w i l l  be protected by a 54 inch thick concrete 
w a l l  between the  reactor room and the solution room. Shielding of the 
reactor room doorway w i l l  be accomplished by construction of a concrete 
block labyrinth (see f i g .  2.1) portions of which w i l l  be removable t o  
provide access f o r  large pieces of equipment. Provisions are  being made 
fo r  ins ta l la t ion  of a 48 inch thick concrete shield door should the  laby- 
r i n t h  type shield prove ineffective.  
A six inch thick concrete f loor ,  one foot thick reinforced concrete 
w a l l s  and roof, and a minimwn of six fee t  of tamped earth cover w i l l  
shield persons outside the  building from radiation. 
Local shielding w i l l  be placed around solution storage tanks t o  re- 
duce the  gamma radiation t o  an acceptable value. 
2.1.6 Ventilation. - A schematic diagram of the  vent i la t ing system 
is shown in figure 2.3. Ventilation of the  reactor room w i l l  occur only 
during shutdown periods. A i r  w i l l  enter the  room through an opening in 
the  gas t i g h t  door in the  corridor. This opening w i l l  include a f i l t e r  
t o  remove dust and foreign matter; a gas t i g h t  cover is  provided which 
w i l l  be secured during reactor operation. An interlock w i l l  insure tha t  
the cover is i n  place pr ior  t o  reactor operation. 
A i r  w i l l  be exhausted fromthe room t o  a short stack. This exhaust 
l ine  w i l l  contain a remotely operated valve fo r  sealing the l ine  during 
operation. This valve w i l l  also be interlocked so that the reactor can- 
not be f i l l e d  unless the valve is closed. 
Ventilation of the reactor room w i l l  be accomplished by a 1000 cf'm 
blower which w i l l  provide approximately 4 a i r  changes per hour. Rocan 
a i r  w i l l  be monitored prior t o  exhausting it t o  the atmosphere. If the 
act ivi ty of the room a i r  exceeds the acceptable l i m i t ,  exhausting the 
a i r  w i l l  be delayed un t i l  the act ivi ty has decayed sufficiently. 
Vents from all fuel  and water tanks in the solution room w i l l  extend 
into the chemical hood which is exhausted t o  the atmosphere through a 
stack. 
2.1.7 Fuel handling system. - A l l  piping, tanks, and appurtenances 
coming in contact with the solution w i l l ,  so f a r  as is practical, be made 
from or coated with a material that  i s  resistant t o  corrosion by the fue l  
solution. A l l  pumps, valves, etc w i l l  be of the packless type t o  m i n i -  
mize leaks. 
Fuel w i l l  normally be stored in shielded storage tanks in the solu- 
t ion room. The diameter of the storage tanks w i l l  be selected in  accord- 
ance with the recommendations of reference 2.1, so that a safe geometry 
w i l l  be maintained, even for the case of inf in i te  water reflector.  In 
addition t o  these there are similar storage f ac i l i t i e s  under the reactor 
platform. The reactor fuel  w i l l  be dumped into these tanks and held up 
there un t i l  the act ivi ty has subsided. 
Fuel w i l l  be pumped into the reactor through a small l ine  (no larger 
than 112 in . ) .  A quick acting dump valve (not less than 1 in.) connect- 
ing the reactor and dump tanks w i l l  provide a rapid dump of the core solu- 
t ion in case of a scram. 
Uranium concentration in the fuel  solution w i l l  be controlled by the 
addition of deionized water for  dilution and by vacuum evaporation for  
concentrat ion. The evaporator w i l l  be sized for  a safe geometry. A more 
complete description of the fuel  handling system is given i n  section 2.2. 
2.1.8 Water and waste handling systems. - Figure 2.4 is  a schematic 
of the water and waste disposal systems. A l l  water used f o r  the reactor 
core and reflector w i l l  be deionized. 
Two waste collection tanks are provided. The first, the radioactive 
waste tank is a sump for  all liquids which may be contaminated. The 
other tank is primarily a holdup tank; however, drains from the uncon- 
taminated sink and the reflector water storage tank w i l l  enter t h i s  tank. 
Reflector water w i l l  be stored in a tank in the reactor room and 
pumped into and drained fromthe reflector as needed. The reflector 
water storage tank may be drained into ei ther  the radioactive waste tank 
or  the holdup tank. 
A bench in the solution roam w i l l  be provided with 2 sinks, one fo r  
contaminated materials which w i l l  drain into the radioactive waste tank 
and another for  uncontaminated materials which w i l l  drain into the hold- 
up tank. 
I In addition, a sink i s  being provided in a chemical hood. This sink 
w i l l  drain into the radioactive waste tank. 
I Contaminated water w i l l  be pumped from the radioactive waste storage 
tank through an ion exchanger into the holdup tank. 
Water in the holdup tank w i l l  be monitored for  activity. If the 
act ivi ty level  i s  acceptable, it w i l l  be pumped into the laboratory sewer 
system. I f  the act ivi ty i s  too high, the water w i l l  be circulated thraugh 
an ion exchanger un t i l  an acceptable level of act ivi ty is  reached and the 
water w i l l  then be discharged into the sewer system. 
It is expected that  the mount of radioactive materials in  the water 
w i l l  be quite small and therefore the resins in the ion exchanger w i l l  be 
usable fo r  a long period of time. These resins w i l l  e i ther  be disposed 
of by an authorized disposal agency or cleaned up and reused. Economics 
and uranium accountability w i l l  determine which method is used. 
I 2.2 Fuel System and Handling 
2 .2 .1  General description of the fuel  system. - The fue l  for  the 
reactor is a U-235 enriched aqueous uranyl fluoride solution. The fue l  
system (see f ig .  2.5) i s  composed of two parts, one in the reactor roam 
and the other in  the solution room. The two are joined by a single line; 
a valve in th i s  l ine  isolates one system from the other. Each system has 
i t s  own pump and storage f ac i l i t i e s .  The fuel  system in  the reactor room 
is used only for  normal reactor operation, while that in the processing 
room i s  used for  storage, concentration changes, mixing, and other pro- 
cessing that m y  be desired. 
2.2.2 Reactor room fuel  system and handling. - The fue l  system in 
the reactor room consists of a storage bank, a pump, necessary valves 
including the dump valve, and the reactor i t s e l f .  
! 
I The storage bank consists of f ive cylinders, with 19  l i t e r  capacity 
each, giving a t o t a l  storage capacity of 95 l i t e r s .  
The pumg w i l l  be capable of pumping fuel  solution both in and out 
of the reactor a t  a maximum ra te  of 4 liters/minute. The pump will be 
controlled manually by a spring-return, center-off switch on the control 
panel. The pumping rate i s  selected by the operator and is continuously 
variable up t o  the mxinaun pumping rate.  The pump shall  be designed t o  
operate a t  flows as low as 60 ml/min so that the operator may easily con- 
t r o l  the fue l  solution in the reactor vessel t o  within two mi l l i l i t e r s .  
This pump w i l l  also be used t o  pump solution between the reactor and solu- 
t ion rooms. The valves w i l l  be so arranged that: 
1. It is impossible t o  pump fuel  from the solution roam directly 
into the reactor. 
2. It i s  impossible t o  pump fuel  from the solution room into the 
reactor room while the reactor is in operation. * 
The dump valve i s  interlocked with the scram circuit,  as described 
in section 2.4. It i s  a normally open flush bottom valve held closed by 
an air cylinder. The valve w i l l  open if  the normally open, air-cylinder 
vent valve opens. The dump valve w i l l  have ambimum diameter of 1 inch. 
Table 2 .1  gives emptying rates fo r  a 1 inch diameter valve as a function 
of height of the solution in  the reactor tank. 
Table 2 .l. - Dumping Rates fo r  a 1-Inch Diameter Valve 
as a Function of Fuel Height in Reactor 
A f loat  type check valve w i l l  prevent solution from entering the 
vent l ine from the top of the storage bank. A sauqling tap w i l l  be pro- 
vided t o  check the concentration of the solution in the storage bank. 
I 






A plast ic  cover fo r  the top of the reactor tank dl1 be provided t o  









* It should be noted that  since the l ine connecting the  two parts of L 
the system is  on the suction side of the pump in the solution room, fue l  
cannot be pwnped into the reactor room by t h i s  pump. 
2.2.3 Processing room fuel  system. - The fuel  system in  the proces- 
sing room consists of two storage banks, evaporator, pump, f i l l i n g  fun- 
nel, and f i l t e r .  
Each storage bank w i l l  be coqosed of f ive cylinders and w i l l  have 
a t o t a l  capacity of 95 l i t e r s .  Each barik w i l l  be provided with a sight 
gauge t o  determine the volume of solution contained. 
The evaporator and condenser w i l l  operate under vacuum and w i l l  be 
capable of remuving about f ive pounds of water per hour from the f'uel. 
Air withdrawn from the system by the vacuum pump w i l l  be bubbled through 
the water storage t o  remave any entrained solids, and be blown out the 
hood exhaust system. Hot water w i l l  provide the heat in the evaporator 
and cold water w i l l  provide cooling in the condenser. The lower portion 
of the condenser w i l l  provide storsge for  the condensed water. 
The f i l l i n g  funnel w i l l  have a capacity of 4 l i t e r s  and be gradwted 
every 5 cc . 
The drain valve w i l l  be locked with a key t o  prevent unauthorized 
removal of fuel .  
2.2.3.1 Fuel handling in processing room. - Concentration changes 
of the fue l  solution w i l l  be accamplished by addition or withdrawal of 
water. Water is added by pouring it into the f i l l i n g  funnel t o  the de- 
sired level. Valves F and P, and valve A2 or B2, depending on which fue l  
solution is t o  be diluted, are then opened and the pump run t o  pump the 
water into the storage tanks. 
Water is withdrawn by running the fuel  solution through the evapor- 
ator .  This i s  accomplished by opening valves E l ,  E2, Al, and A2 (or B 1  
and B2 i f  it is desired t o  concentrate the "B" solution) and running the 
pumg. The amount of water removed w i l l  be determined by reading a sight 
gauge on the storage portion of the condenser. 
The solution w i l l  be mixed by recirculating it through the storage 
tanks. This w i l l  be accomplished by opening valves P, A 1  and A2 (or B 1  
and ~ 2 ) .  
Fuel w i l l  be transferred t o  the reactor room by opening the proper 
valve A 1  or B1, valve R and running the p q  in the reactor room. 
Sampling of the fue l  solution w i l l  be accomplished by drawing solu- 
t ion out through the drain l ine.  
2.2.3.2 Fuel inventory. - Storage f ac i l i t i e s  w i l l  be provided in 
which the fue l  as received can be locked un t i l  it is loaded into the fue l  
system. 
The fuel  solution w i l l  be analyzed by standard chemical methods t o  
determine the concentration of uranium 
2.2.4 Chemical aspects of the fuel  system. - The concentration of 
the fue l  solution may be varied t o  correspond t o  hydrogen - uranium ra- 
t i o s  of from 1000 t o  25. The solubility l i m i t  of uranyl fluoride in 
water at room temperature i s  about 65 weight percent which corresponds 
t o  a hydrogen - uranium ra t io  of about 18. The pH of the fuel  solution 
w i l l  be maintained between 5 and 6.  During operation of the evaporator, 
small quantities of hydrofluoric acid w i l l  be los t  t o  the vent system 
from the fuel  solution. Care w i l l  be taken t o  insure that  the hydro- 
fluoric acid i s  not released i n  a manner which w i l l  cause a health hazard. 
Acidity of the fue l  w i l l  be maintained by the addition of hydrofluoric 
acid. 
In order t o  maintab a high purity of the fuel  solution, the entire 
fuel  system, wherever feasible, w i l l  be of suitable plast ic  materials, 
or w i l l  be coated with a suitable plast ic  so that  f i e 1  solution w i l l  cam 
in contact with plast ic  only. 
2.2.5 Special physical aspects of the system. - It is essential that  
the system design be such t h a t  it is impossible fo r  the fue l  solution t o  
accidently become c r i t i ca l .  A l l  compon~nts and the integral arrangement 
of the fuel  system have been designed within the tolerances given in  
Nuclear Safety Guide (ref .  2.1)  . The tolerances met are those fo r  the 
most crucial H/U ra t io  and for  an infini te  water reflector.  For exatrple, 
a l l  fuel  storage tanks are  of a diameter such that fo r  an infini tely long 
cylinder containing an aqueous U-235 solution of any concentration and 
being surrounded by an infini te  water reflector, the system w i l l  be sub- 
c r i t i ca l .  Likewise the evaporator, condenser, and a l l  associated piping 
w i l l  be of safe geometry, even if they were t o  be f i l l e d  with fuel  solu- 
t ion and surrounded with an inf in i te  water reflector.  
Another important aspect of the system design i s  that it be such 
that  loss of fue l  w i l l  be kept t o  a m-lnimum. A study of the f i e 1  system 
schematic (f ig.  2.5) w i l l  show that  there are s ix  places fue l  can enter 
or leave the system: 
(1) the drain at the low point i n  the system 
(2)  the graduated funnel provided fo r  feeding the system 
(3) the reactor i t se l f ,  which is open I 
(4)  the concentrat ion system 
(5) a leak in the system 
(6) the sampling pipet on the reactor storage bank 
The sampling tap  and drain from which the fue l  solution can be eas i ly  
withdrawn w i l l  be under lock and key. The top of the f i l l i n g  funnel is 
higher than any point in the  system, hence the  fue l  solution is  not eas i ly  
removable v ia  t h i s  entry. Since the  dump valve w i l l  be open when the  
reactor room door is  not sealed, f u e l  solution cannot be contained in  
the  reactor while people are  working i n  the  room. The concentration sys- 
tem, a vacuum evaporative system, w i l l  operate a t  low ra tes  so tha t  only 
water w i l l  be removed frm the f u e l  system a t  t h i s  point. The actual  
amount of UV carried over m y  be about 0.1 - 1.0 ppm ( ref .  2.2). Should 
uranyl fluoride be carried over by improper operation of the  evaporator, 
it w i l l  be collected in  the water storage tank a t  the  e x i t  of the  
condenser. 
Should a large leak develop in the system, the fue l  solution would 
spread out on the f loor  (the f loor  drains are  normally closed). It would 
be contained i n  the  reactor room or solution room, since these f loor  
areas are the lowest points in  the  structure and each i s  cwered by a 
s i x  inch deep s tainless  s t e e l  pan which extends over the ent i re  f loo r  
area.  In  order t o  detect small leaks, the ent i re  fue l  system w i l l  be 
periodically checked. In  order t o  prevent leaks, a l l  components w i l l  be 
of the  packless type. 
2.2.6 Fuel ac t iv i ty  and gas evolution. - Since the reactor m a y  be 
m at power levels  up t o  10 watts, moderate f i ss ion  product ac t iv i ty  
w i l l  be encountered. Table 2.2 gives ac t iv i t i e s  of the fue l  solution 
a f t e r  operation of 10 and 100 minutes a t  10 watts, and various shutdown 
times as  computed by the Way-Wigner formula ( ref .  2.3) . 
Table 2.2 - Total Activity M t e r  Operating a t  
10 Watts f o r  Given Period 
The radioactive f i s s ion  gases released during reactor operation w i l l  
be handled by the  vent i la t ion system as described in section 2.1.6. 
Shutdown 
time, 
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The a m a t  of HZ and 02 formed radiolyt ical ly w i l l  be about 150 cc 
per hour when the reactor is operating a t  10 watts. Almost all of t h i s  
gas w i l l  be released and w i l l  be handled by the  ventilation system. 
2 -3 Reactor Physics 
The specific reactor configuration which has been chosen fo r  the 
initial c r i t i c a l i t y  experiment i s  an unref lected cylinder with c r i t i c a l  
dimensions of 29.5 cm diameter and 59.0 cm height and with an approximate 
c r i t i c a l  mass of 2100 grams of f u l l y  enriched uranium. Reactor analyses 
f o r  the family of U02F2-H20 solution reactors and some of the  reasons fo r  
selecting the  foregoing configurations as  the  first of a ser ies  t o  be 
studied are given herein. The method fo r  calculating these homogeneous 
reactors is  tha t  of reference 2.4 which sa t i s fac tor i ly  predicts the  c r i t -  
i c a l i t y  of the  Oak Ridge solution reactors presented in reference 2.5. 
The method. of reactor analysis is essent ial ly  a group diffusion anal- 
ysis  making use of the  peculiarly rapid slowing down properties of hydro- 
gen and including the  effects  of epithermal absorption and f iss ion.  The 
cancept of re f lec tor  savings, evaluated by two-group procedures, is em- 
ployed in calculating the c r i t i c a l i t y  of reflected assemblies. 
2.3.1 Uranium requirements. - The calculated fu l ly  enriched uranium 
requirements, fo r  cylindrical cores of L/D (length-diameter r a t io )  of 
unity, a re  shown as a function of core diameter in figure 2.6. Cr i t i ca l  
requirements are shown for  bare cores and for  cores reflected by large 
thicknesses of water. Fuel concentration of the solutions are indicated 
by the hydrogen-uranium atom ra t io ,  R .  
The curves exhibit a minimum in both uranium requirement and core 
diameter. A minimum uranium requirement, occurring as  a resul t  of re la-  
t i v e  r a t e s  of neutron leakage, absorption, and production, i s  a usual c r i t -  
i c a l i t y  character is t ic  (see r e f .  2.3) . However, the character is t ic  of a 
minimum core diameter regardless of f u e l  concentration (within the l imits  
of so lubi l i ty)  is  peculiar t o  solution-type reactors and resu l t s  from the  
rapid reduction i n  hydrogen-atom density due t o  displacement of water by 
uranyl-fluoride f o r  solutions with values of R less  than 200. The fore- 
going minima occur a t  respective values of R of about 500 and 80 and en- 
suing discussions w i l l  be res t r ic ted  t o  these values of R .  
Uranium requirements f o r  c r i t i c a l  cylindrical bare and water re-  
f lected cores of L/D other than unity are  shown i n  figure 2.7. The spe- 
c i f  i c  reactor selected f o r  the i n i t i a l  c r i t i c a l  experiment i s  indicated 
i n  figure 2.7 a t  
tJU 2100 grams 
L/D 2 
The anticipated c r i t i c a l  heights, Hc, and c r i t i c a l  diameters, Dc, 
f o r  bare and water ref lected cyl indrical  cores a re  shown in figures 2.8 
and 2.9, respectively. Included i n  the  figures a re  actual  data points 
taken from reference 2.5 f o r  values of R near 80 and 500. A comparison 
of calculations and experimental data f o r  other values of R i s  presented 
i n  reference 2.4. Also shown on the figures are  the calculated diameters 
f o r  c r i t i c a l  cyl indrical  cores of in f in i t e  height and heights f o r  c r i t -  
i c a l  cyl indrical  cores of in f in i t e  diameter. 
2.3.2 Sensi t ivi ty  a t  c r i t i c a l i t y .  - In order t o  gauge the  sensi t iv-  
i t y  of the  various cyl indrical  configurations a t  c r i t i c a l i t y ,  a ser ies  of 
reac t iv i ty  calculations were made f o r  par t icular  configurations during 
the  approach t o  c r i t i c a l .  These resu l t s  a re  presented in f igures  2.10 
and 2.11 i n  which the  effect ive multiplication factor ,  Keff, is  shown as 
a function of core height f o r  bare and water ref lected cores, respectively. 
The slope of each curve is a measure of the sens i t iv i ty  of the configura- 
t i o n  t o  increments in core height. The "pancake" reactors of L/D of 1/4 
a re  much more sensi t ive than the  long reactors of L/D of 2 . 
Values of sens i t iv i ty  may be expressed i n  uni ts  of r eac t iv i ty  per 
uni t  core height a t  c r i t i c a l i t y  ( K ~ ~ ~  = 1). The uni t  of r eac t iv i ty  used 
is  the dol la r  which i s  equivalent t o  the reac t iv i ty  associated with the  
delayed neutron f rac t ion  taken t o  be 0.00692 from the data of reference 
2.6. The sens i t iv i ty  in cents per millimeter i s  shown as a function of 
c r i t i c a l  core diameter i n  f igures  2.12 and 2.13 f o r  bare and water re-  
f lected assemblies, respectively. Sens i t iv i t ies  are  large f or  the  "pan- 
cake" reactors,  decreasing as L/D is  increased. The sens i t iv i ty  f o r  the  
i n i t i a l  c r i t i c a l  experiment is about 3 cents per millimeter of height as 
is indicated in figure 2.12. 
These sens i t iv i ty  resu l t s  may be t ranslated in to  volumes which w i l l  
add prompt reac t iv i ty  and so provide information which may be used t o  
es tab l i sh  c r i t e r i a  f o r  solution f i l l i n g  r a t e s .  These data a re  shown i n  
figures 2.14 and 2.15 as a function of core L/D f o r  bare and water re- 
f lected c r i t i c a l  assemblies, respectively . The i n i t i a l  c r i t i c a l  experi- 
ment is indicated i n  figure 2.14 f o r  which a volume of 3200 cc is neces- 
sary t o  add prompt reac t iv i ty .  It is  interest ing t o  note tha t  the  volume 
required t o  add prompt reac t iv i ty  has a minimum which occurs i n  the re- 
gion f o r  "pancake" reactors . 
2.3.3 Calibration of bare core height and reac t iv i ty .  - In order t o  
use a reactor t o  measure reac t iv i ty  e f fec ts  of fuel ,  moderator, absorber, 
o r  void, excess reac t iv i ty  must be controlled i n  some manner. In thermal 
heterogeneous reactors,  control  rods are  usually the most convenient way 
f o r  measuring excess reac t iv i ty .  The control rods may be experimentally 
calibrated by several methods. One commonly used method i s  t o  d is t r ibute  
thermal neutron poisons of known reac t iv i ty  e f fec t  uniformly throughout 
the reactor core; the decrease in  reactivity due t o  these poisons is cam- 
pensated by withdrawal of rod or  rods t o  maintain c r i t i ca l i ty .  In th i s  
manner a control rod calibration curve i s  generated. Another method is 
t o  withdraw a rod or rods suddenly so as t o  put the reactor on asymptotic 
stable periods, f o r  which the corresponding-reactivities axe ham from 
the inhour relation. This method is limited by the range in power that  
may be tolerated in  permitting the reactor period t o  stabil ize.  
Both of these methods are applicable t o  homogeneous react ore ; how- 
ever, the unique situation of fuel  solubility permits reactivity effects 
t o  be measured by changes in c r i t i c a l  core height rather than by control 
rods. In th i s  way the perturbing effects of the presence of rods in the 
core is eliminated. To establish experimentally the variation of core 
height with reactivity, the fuel  i t se l f  may be used effectively as  the 
distributed "poison" by varying i t s  concentration and determining c r i t -  
i c a l  core height. Such calibrations would be valid fo r  several percent 
reactivity about any given core configuration. An approximate calibra- 
tion cullre fo r  the i n i t i a l  c r i t i c a l  experiment under consideration i s  
shawn in figure 2.16 as calculated by present methods . The true calibra- 
tion curve w i l l  be established by experiment. I f  one could sat isfactori ly 
represent the experimental data in an analytic manner (for example, with 
the group-diffusion c r i t i ca l i ty  relations used herein), one could gener- 
a te  curves of Keff against core height as shown in figure 2.10 and 2.11. 
Such curves would then serve as working calibration curves fo r  measuring 
reactivity effects of perturbations t o  c r i t i c a l  asseniblies. 
In principle, it i s  also possible t o  use fuel  concentration instead 
of core height as a measure of reactivity, although th i s  i s  not a prac- 
t i c a l  procedure in  the present fac i l i ty .  
2.3.4 Neutron lifetime. - Mean prompt neutron lifetimes fo r  the 
homogeneous assemblies are important parameters fo r  estimating reactor 
periods following insertions of reactivity of the order of me dollsr.  
These lifetimes or generation times have been estimated fo r  a few bare 
c r i t i c a l  assemblies as the sum of a neutron sluwing down time and a 
thermal neutron diffusion tixne, and are given below in microseconds: 




































The neutron slowing down time is that f o r  water based on the value 
of 10 ps fo r  an infini te  water medium from reference 2.3 and corrected 
fo r  leakage in the bare c r i t i c a l  assemblies. The thermal neutron dif- 
fusion times f o r  these bare assemblies are calculated by relations in 
reference 2.3. It is of interest that although a large fraction of f i s -  
sions i n  the bare c r i t i c a l  assemblies of R of 80 and 25 occur a t  ener- 
gies other than thermal, these fissions occur i n  the epithermal region 
so that  the slowing down times are not significantly affected. The 
thermal diffusion time, however, is reduced by the increased absorptiv- 
i t y  of the solution. 
The mean prompt lifetimes fo r  reflected assemblies, of course, w i l l  
be much longer because of the effective holdup in  the water reflector.  
 h he thermal diffusion t i m e  in water is about 200 psec). 
2.4 Reactor Control and Instrumentation 
Inasmuch as the solution reactors considered herein a re  t o  be used 
in  c r i t i c a l i t y  experiments, in the measurement of reactivity effects, and 
as a neutron source a t  t o t a l  powers up t o  10 watts, m i n i m a l  excess reac- 
t i v i t i e s  are required. The approach t o  c r i t i ca l i ty  in every experiment 
is controlled by the f i l l i n g  ra te  of the fuel  solution and core height is 
used as the measure of reactivity. Conventional control rods are absent 
in these reactors. Control of the reactor in approaching c r i t i c a l i t y  is 
directly under the supervision of the reactor operator who controls solu- 
tion f i l l i n g  or withdrawing rate. 
The sole action overriding the control of the reactor operator i s  
that of f u l l  scram. The scram mechanism w i l l  consist of a safety rod and 
a dump valve operated by the scram circuits .  Annunciators w i l l  warm the 
operator of minor emergencies so that corrective action may be taken 
without scramming the reactor. 
2.4.1 1nstrumnts;tion. - A block diagram of the instnunentation i s  
shown in figure 2.17. The counter channels w i l l  be used mainly in s ta r t -  
up operation t o  obtain source multiplication curves. The ion chamber 
channels w i l l  be used as the control channels in  the operating range. 
Power fa i lure  w i l l  actuate a l l  the scram circuits  thereby making all 
the safety channels f a i l  safe. 
Fuel temperature in the reactor vessel and storage tank, reflector 
temperature, and roam temperature w i l l  be monitored during operation. 
Dosimeters w i l l  be placed throughout the c r i t i c a l  f ac i l i t y  area t o  deter- 
mine mximum level  and doses in case of a power excursion. 
To insure that safe procedure w i l l  be followed i n  start-up of the 
reactor, the following conditions w i l l  be established by the use of 
interlocks : 
1. Gas tight door t o  the reactor r o m  closed and locked 
2. F i l t e r  cover in gas-tight door in position and locked 
3. Safety rod ful ly  withdrawn 
4. Source fu l ly  inserted 
5. A l l  valves between solution storage roam aad assembly r o m  locked 
in  "operate reactor" position 
6. Ventilation t o  reactor roam off.  
2.4.2 Control mechanisms. - Fxcept in  the case of emergency, control 
w i l l  be maintained by adjustment of the amount of fuel  in the reactor. 
The parameter used in  control w i l l  be the height of the fuel  in the reac- 
to r  tank. This height w i l l  be measured remotely by two independently 
operated micrometer screws. A pointer w i l l  be fastened t o  the end of 
the micrometer screw and contact with the surface of the fuel  w i l l  com- 
plete an e lect r ica l  circuit  g ivhg  indication on an ohmmeter. 
In case of an emergency, the first bdication w i l l  be annunciators 
showing that  a predetermined power level  or minirmun period has been ex- 
ceeded. A t  th i s  signal, the operator w l l l  stop adding fue l  t o  the assem- 
bly, and, if necessary s t a r t  withdrawing fuel .  If t h i s  action f a i l s  t o  
remedy the emergency, then the scram circuits  w i l l  be actuated by a 
sl ightly higher power level or shorter period. The scram signal w i l l  
cause both the safety rod t o  drop and the dump valve t o  upen. The mln- 
imum periods and maximum power levels of the t r i p  circuits  w i l l  be deter- 
mined by the scientist-in-charge before start-up of the reactor. Abso- 
lu te  limits w i l l  be determined by the local safeguards ccmrmittee asd w i l l  
never be exceeded. A manual scram button w i l l  be located on the operat- 
ing console fo r  the use of the operator. 
The safety rod w i l l  meet the following specifications: 
1. Fa i l  safe release mechanism 
2. Shutdown reactivity worth of about 2 percent 
3. Physical design such that  the entry of the rod into the fuel w i l l  
cause a minimum hydrodynamic disturbance 
4. Actuating time c q a t i b l e  with the electronic c i rcu i t ry  
the release of the rod, 
The source drive mechanism w i l l  be a simple rack and pinion or cable 
and pulley assembly. A selsyn w i l l  indicate source position and, as pre- 
viously mentioned, an interlock w i l l  insure that the source is ful ly  in- 
serted prior  t o  start-up. Optimum source and detector locations fo r  ob- 
taining multiplication curves w i l l  be determined experimentally on a sub- 
critical.  assembly before an attempt is made t o  bring the reactor c r i t i ca l .  
2.4.3 Operations. - A l l  operations w i l l  be preceeded by a detaiied 
check-out procedure. This w i l l  consist of actuating all mechanisms and 
source calibration of a l l  s d e t y  and control circuits .  The person per- 
forming the check-out w i l l  enter a l l  instrument readings obtained during 
the check-out and note the operation of a l l  mechanisms in a logbook. 
This w i l l  be personally approved by the scientist-in-charge before any 
addition of reactivity t o  the assembly. 
1 When fue l  i s  transferred from the storage room t o  the assembly room, 
I an analysis w i l l  be made before any operation t o  insure that  the f i e 1  is 
of the specified density. 
A detailed approach t o  c r i t i c a l  w i l l  be made following any change 
I t o  the assenib1.y or fue l  concentration, This approach w i l l  consist of obtaining a reasonably l inear plot of inverse count against fue l  height 
I so that the c r i t i c a l  height caa be extrapolated. Fuel w i l l  be added in 1 increments decreasing in  size as determined by the scientist-in-charge. 
I A detailed start-up and operating manual w i l l  be written prior t o  
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3. SITE 
3.1 General Si te  Location 
The proposed NACA zero power reactor fac i l i ty  is  t o  be located on 
the reservation of the NACA Lewis Flight Propulsion Laboratory. This 
laboratory is situated a t  the extreme southwest corner of Cleveland, 
Ohio, near the junction of Ohio routes 1 7  and 237. This location is in- 
dicated on figure 3.1, which i s  a map of Cle~eland and some of the sur- 
rounding area. 
Figure 3.2 is  a composite ae r ia l  photograph of Lewis laboratory and 
the surrounding area for a radius of about three miles. Figure 3.3 i s  a 
closeup aer ia l  photograph of the laboratory. These two figures present 
some idea a s  t o  the local terrain, and also the local population d i s t r i -  
bution. Adjacent t o  the laboratory on the east is  Cleveland Hopkins A i r -  
port; t o  the north and west of the laboratory i s  a section of the Cleve- 
land Metropolitan Park System; on the south i s  sparsely populated farm 
land. 
The closest residence i s  about 900 feet t o  the southeast of the re- 
actor and the second is about 2000 feet  t o  the southwest. The nearest 
1 
major airport buildings are about l5 miles t o  the southeast; there are 
some l ight  plane hangars about 1000 feet from the proposed s i t e .  The 
closest point open t o  the public i s  on the airport grounds adjacent t o  
the NACA fence (see f ig.  3.3) a t  a distance of about 200 feet.  The clos- 
es t  point not on airport grounds open t o  the public i s  about 700 feet  from 
the reactor s i t e .  There i s  a fa i r ly  densely populated area t o  the north. 
1 This area i s  about lZ miles *om the proposed faci l i ty .  
In addition t o  the two aer ia l  photographs, a plan of the laboratory 
i s  shown in  figure 3.4. This figure shows the location of the proposed 
fac i l i ty  with respect t o  the adjacent buildings and f ac i l i t i e s  of the 
. Lewis laboratory. 
3.2 Meteorology 
Meteorology data for the proposed s i t e  are  presented i n  table 3.1 
and in  the insert ( ~ o c a l  Climatological Data for the Cleveland area). 
Table 3.1 i s  a table of annual wind frequencies and velocities taken a t  
Cleveland Hopkins Airport which i s  adjacent t o  the s i t e .  These data 
were obtained from the U. S. Weather Bureau a t  Cleveland, Ohio. 
Inversion data have not been taken by the Cleveland Weather Bureau; 
it is the opinion of the meteorologist i n  charge of the Cleveland Weather 
Bureau that ,  i f  averaged over a long period of time, these data for the 
Cleveland area would not be too different from that  of the Toledo area 
where radio soundings are  taken (ref.  3.1). Table 3.2 is a table of the 
inversion data for  the Toledo area. 
Table 3.1. - Annual Prevailing Winds 













































































-. - - - - - - - -~ - 
WEATHER B U R E N  
LOCAL CL CAL DATA 




Clevela.nd is on the south shore of Lake Erie which has 
an average level of 572 feet a.bove mea.n sea level. 
Metropolitan Cleveland has a lake frontage of 31 miles 
and it reaches inland a.bout 16 miles with a total area. 
of about 250 square miles or a little more than half 
of Cuyahoga County. The surrounding terrain is mostly 
level except for a ridge on the southeastern edge of 
the city rising some 500 feet a.bove the shore terrain. 
A rather deep but narrow North-South valley, in which 
flows the Cuyahoga River, approximately bisects the 
City of Cleveland. The climate is mainly continental 
in character but with strong modifying influences by 
Lake Erie. Otherwise, local topogra.phy is of minor 
importance as a determining factor. 
The Weather Bureau Office is located at Cleveland 
Hopkins Airport, 10 miles southwest of the downtown 
business area and about 5 miles south of the lake shore- 
line where the official weather records have been main- 
tained since 1941. Records since 1871 were previously 
made in downtown Cleveland as designated on the last 
page of this publication. Comparative records show 
that daytime temperatures average from 2 to 4 degrees 
higher at the Airport except during the winter months 
and that nighttime temperatures average from 2 to 4 
degrees lower at the Airport during all seasons. Dif- 
ferences as much as 12' have occurred on some individual 
days. Precipitation differences between the two loca- 
tions are slight. 
In the winter Cleveland lies in the path of many cold 
air masses advancing south and east from Canada but the 
accompanying low temperatures are usually mitigated by 
such air having to cross the relatively warm waters of 
the lake. Such a combination, however, despite the 
ameliorating temperature effects of the lake, results 
in an excessive amount of winter cloudiness and quite 
3LOGICAL SUMMARY 
frequent snows. The persistence of snow cover is 
seldom great, though, since the tempera.ture rarely 
remains freezing for any considerable length of time. 
Spring is generally a brief and rather sporadic tran- 
sition season, the noticeable change being ra.ther from 
wintry to summerlike conditions in a relatively short 
period. The possibility of a temperature of 3Z0 or 
below remains until the middle of May, although the 
average latest date is April 21. 
In summer, Lake Erie plays its winter role in reverse; 
when sections further inland are experiencing heat waves, 
the "lake breeze" frequently sets in locally and sections 
near the shore enjoy its cooling effect which is notice- 
able for a considerable distance inland. 
Autumn is usually the most pleasant season of the year 
with mild sunny weather often being prolonged into 
November and even December. The average date of the 
first temperature of 32' or below is November 2, and 
the average growing season is 195 days, considerably 
longer than for most locations in this latitude, or in 
Ohio. 
Precipitation is moderate in amount and evenly distribu- 
ted throughout the year, while humidity is moderately 
high. During excessively heavy rains in summer thunder- 
storms maximum falls have reached 1.20 inches in 10 
minutes; 2.09 inches in one hour; 3.02 inches in two 
hours and 4.97 inches in 24 hours. Much heavier falls 
have occurred in the elevated sections of the eastern 
suburbs. -Although tornadoes are fairly common in Ohio, 
only three have occurred in Cleveland during 84 years 
of record, the most severe of which occurred on June 8, 

































































































































































































































































































































CLEVELAND BOPKINS AIRPORT 
1956 
Year 
DOWNTOWN CLmBbAND - 2605 EUCLID AVENDE PRIOR TO MARCH 1955, TH&FZAFTl% FROM AIRPORT 
June 
MONTHLY AND SEASONAL DEGREE DAYS 
July Jan. 
Special Data Tabulations have been printed in previous Summaries as follows: 
Mar. Feb. 
July 
1946 - Daily Extremes of Temperature and Year 
Aug. 
1946 - Dates of Killing rrosis 
1946 - Maximum Precipitation of Record 
1944.- Times of Sunrise and Sunset 
Apr. 
Aus. 
1944 - Lake Brie Average Water Temperature 
1940 - Monthly and Annual Hours of Sunshine 








Dec. Jsn. Feb. Mar. Apr. Total May J u n e  
CLEVELAND, OHIO 
MONTHLY AM> SEASONAL SNOWFALL CLEVELAND HOPKINS AIRPORT 1956 
Season July Aug. Sept Oet Nor. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June Total S-on July Aug. .?apt. Oct Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. M u .  Apr May June Total 











NWRC., Asheville, N. C. --- 1/30/57 --- 1275 
The horizontal l i n e s  d ram on the Average Temperature Total  Precipi tat ion,  Monthly and Seasonal Degree Days, and Monthly and Seasonal Snowfall tables  separate 
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Table 3.2. - Inversion Data   oled do, Ohio 1946-1950) 
(a) Percentage frequency of base of inversion. 





(c) Percentage of inversions base a t  the surface with 












a Less than 1 percent. 
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The s i t e  area i s  situated approximately five miles south of M e  
Erie. The elevation a t  th i s  point i s  about 760 feet,  188 feet  above 
Lake Erie. 
Test so i l  borings were taken a t  the Laboratory near the reactor 
s i t e  by the H. C. Nutting Company, Cincinnati, Ohio, i n  June, 1952. The 
maximum depth of the t e s t  holes was 50 feet.  These borings indicate 
that ,  starting a t  the surface, there i s  between 8.5 and 10 feet  of brown 
sandy clay with some gravel. This i s  followed by 14 t o  24 feet  of blue 
sandy clay and gravel, and t h i s  i s  followed by grey hard shale which ap- 
pears a t  depths of from 24 t o  34 feet.  
Figure 3.5 i s  a geology map of a section of the Cleveland, Euclid, 
Berea quadrangle showing the location of the Lewis Flight Prapulsion 
Laboratory and the location of the reactor faci l i ty .  
3.4 Reference 
3.1 Personal Communications, H. W. Burke (MIC), P. F. Jacobay, 
United States Weather Bureau, Cleveland Hopkins Airport, 
Cleveland, Ohio. 
4. EXPER- WITH ~ C T Q R  
Experiments to be performed with the proposed solution-type reactor 
fall into three categories which will be separately d&scussed: 
(1) Experiments concerned with criticality of various homo- 
geneous reactor configurations. 
(2) Experiments in which given reactor configurations are 
used to measure reactivity effects of inhomogeneities 
of various k2nd.s and sizes in the core. 
(3) Experiments in which the reactor serves as a neutron 
source to apparatus external to the core. 
4.1 Critical Assembly Experiments 
Criticality experiments will be performed for cylindrical homogene- 
ous assemblies of UOZFZ-HZO solutions for a range of core diameter, core 
length-diameter ratio, and fuel concentration. The copes will be bare, 
partially reflected, or fully reflected by water or other suitable re- 
flector material. The approach-to-critical procedures are outlined in 
section 2.4. 
The purpose of such a series of experiments is to establish suffi- 
cient information for calibrating particular reactor configurations for 
safely measuring reactivity effects of inhomogeneities in the core. The 
use of core height as a means of measuring reactivity has been discussed 
in section 2.3.3. Of course, the basic criticality data for these clean 
configurations also serves to provide data additional to that of refer- 
ence 4.1 upon which to formulate general analytical models. 
Techniques of flux distribution measurement and absolute power de- 
terminations may be perfected with these experiments. Radiation surveys 
of the reactor room and surroundings will be made. Fuel mass and tem- 
perature coefficients of reactivity will be ascertained. 
4.2 Reactivity Effects Experiments 
From the results of the critical experiments, it will be possible 
to select a safe and satisfactory reactor configuration with which to 
measure various reactivity effects. The method of using adjoint fluxes 
in perturbation theory satisfactorily predicts hamogeneous and local re- 
activity effects of changes in camposition which are sufficiently -11 
so as not to alter the neutron fluxes significantly. Most of the changes 
in reactor composition of practical interest, however, are sufficiently 
large to alter the fluxes in and around the disturbance. 
For example, of greater interest to boiling reactors and to an un- 
derstanding of shut-down mechanism in liquid reactors, is the spatial 
worth of bubbles or voids of various size. In the present reactor, re- 
activity effects of voids may be measured by a series of experiments in 
which plastic bubbles filled successively with fuel solutions, water, 
and air are traversed through the core. In each case, the core height 
at criticality serves as a measure of reactivity. 
An extension of the foregoing experiment would be to superpose small 
voids along the axis of the core in order to estimate reactivity effects 
of neutrons streaming through axial air passages. Usual diffusion theory 
procedures for calculating reactors with gas flow passages involve homo- 
genizing these effective voids. These reactivity experiments would sup- 
ply a measure for the validity of such calculation procedures. 
Another device usually employed in diffusion theory calculations is 
to ignore finiteness of clad fuel-element subassemblies and to assume 
that these are homogenized with other constituents of the core. Again, 
it may be possible to employ the present clean homogeneous cores as a 
three-dimensional integrating device to experimentally determine self- 
shielding factors for reactor repetitive "cells". This could be done by 
inserting these "cells" in the reactor container, filling with U02F2-H20 
solution until just critical and noting relative reactivities of various 
"cell" configurations. 
A final example of the use of the reactor is the measurement of de- 
tailed flux distributions near concentrated absorbers like control rods 
or near core-reflector interfaces of greatly different diffusion prop- 
erties. Such distributions would serve as checks on calculated fluxes 
obtained from diffusion theory approximations. 
4.3 Reactor as a Neutron Source 
Although the maximum power for these reactors is a total of 10 
watts, average thermal neutron flues of about lo8 neutron/cm2sec are 
available in bare cores and in reflectors of reflected assemblies. 
Hence, exposure of samples in these moderate fluxes permits various ac- 
tivation experiments to be performed. 
Furthermore, the possibility of taking neutron beam out of the re- 
f lector  provides means for measuring diff'usion and slowing down param- 
e ters  i n  various media through use of a fissJon plate. These beams may 
also be used for low level activations. A rather extensive se t  of re- 
actor physics experiments which may be performed w i t h  low level  neutron 
intensi t ies are given i n  reference 4.2 and 4.3. 
A very important use of the radiation f ie lds  outside of the reactor 
i s  for  nuclear instrument development. The presence of leakage gamma 
and neutron radiations resulting from fission provide the exact spectra 
t o  be analyzed by spectrometers under development. 
4.4 References 
4.1 Beck, C.  K. e t  a l :  Cri t ical  Mass Studies, Part 111, Report K-343 
April 19, 1949. 
4.2 Reactor F'hysics Laboratory Manual, Oak Ridge School of Reactor 
Technology TID-5262, July, 1955. 
4.3 Flora, J. W.: Educational Uses of the Smal l  5-Watt Laboratory 
Reactor, 2nd Nuclear Engineering and Science Conference. March 
11-14, 1957. Paper 57-NESC-73. 
5. HlLZARDS 
5.1 Hazards Due t o  Acts of God, Negligence, and Sabotage 
5.1.1 Severe storms. - The two most severe types of storms common 
t o  the Cleveland area are thunderstorms and tornadoes. Thunderstorms 
average about 39 days a year i n  the area, and have been known t o  deposit 
1.2 inches of ra in  i n  10 minutes, with winds i n  excess of 50 miles per 
hour. 
Tornadoes are fa i r ly  common i n  Ohio, but only three have occurred 
i n  the Cleveland area during 84 years of record, the most severe.of 
which occurred on June 8, 1953. 
Because the fac i l i ty  structure i s  t o  be made of reinforced concrete 
and partly underground with a mound of earth aver the top, neither 
thunderstorms nor tornadoes are  expected t o  be damaging. A t  most, such 
storms could disrupt e lect r ica l  power to the faci l i ty ,  but th i s  would 
cause no harm t o  the reactor since the reactor would scram. 
5.1.2 Floods. - Flooding of the area is highly unlikely because of 
the general sloping terrain. Immediately west of the laboratory i s  a 
deep r iver valley, and a l l  of the surface drainage is into t h i s  valley. 
Flooding of the fac i l i ty  i s  also unlikely, but i f  it did occur, no seri-  
ous hazard would result  since a l l  of the fuel  mt  i n  use is  stored i n  
leak t ight  cans, and are so situated and sized that, even though fully 
surrounded by water, a c r i t i c a l  assembly would not result.  It i s  assumed 
that i f  flooding should s t a r t  t o  occur during operation, sufficient time 
would be available for the operator t o  drain the reactor vessel f i e1  into 
the appropriate storage vessels. 
5.1.3 Earthquakes. - Table 5.1 i s  a chart of earthquakes i n  Ohio. 
The Cleveland area has no reported earthquake history. 
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The general area of these earthquakes is about 125 miles from 
Cleveland. It is felt that earthquakes present no great hazard to the 
facility. 
5.1.4 Sabotage. - Sabotage is probably one of the most difficult 
hazards to provide for in a design. It would be very difficult for a 
nonemployee to gain access to the facility, because the reservation can 
be entered only through two well guarded gates. Furthemore, the pro- 
posed facility is to be built as an addition to one wing of an existing 
building. Access to the facility will be through this building which is 
under guard at all times. 
Sabotage by an employee or a demented person is more likely to occur. 
It is foolhardy to say that sabotage by these types of persons could not 
be attempted, but an effort will be made, by a system of interlocks, to 
make it much more difficult to accomplish. Even if a saboteur did gain 
access to the facility, it would be difficult to sabotage the facility in 
such a way that the hazard to the surrounding population would be greater 
than that of the maxhmm credible accident which is discussed in section 
5.2. 
5.1.5 Negligence. - The history of accidents in atomic energy ac- 
tivities has shown that negligence is one of the largest contributing 
factors to accidents. Probably the most difficult task in preventing 
negligence is that of promoting continued safety consciousness even 
though no accidents have occurred. 
In an effort to prevent negligence, rigid rules pertaining to the 
welfare and safety of persons in or around the reactor area will be es- 
tablished. The handling of the reactor and associated equipment will at 
all times be under the strict control of a licensed operator. A logbook 
and check lists will be maintained by the operator in charge of the fa- 
cility. Also, any other precautions which are deemed necessary to pre- 
vent negligence, will be instituted. 
5.2 Maximum Credible Accident 
Two accidents will be considered here. Erst, the excursion result- 
ing from the inability of the control system to compensate for a very 
rapid increase in reactivity. Second, a modified start-up accident in 
which it is assumed that the reactor vessel is being filled at the maxi- 
mum possible rate (4 liters/min) , that this filling rate is accidentally 
maintained beyond reactor criticality, and that control system fails to 
operate. 
The order of discussion w i l l  be as follows: 
(1) The magnitude of the nuclear excursion including es t i -  
mates of the t o t a l  energy release and the maximum pres- 
sure r ise .  
(2) The ab i l i ty  of the reactor room t o  contain the excursion. 
(3) The radiological hazards f r o m  the release of the fission 
products. 
5.2.1 The nuclear excursion. - 
5.2.1.1 The step-increase accident. - There are several different 
types of accidental events which might result  in  very rapid increases i n  
reactivity; for example, the sh i f t  of a poison t o  a region of less  sta-  
t i s t i c a l  importance, the flooding of a void space in  the core, surface 
waves i n  a pancake type reactor, etc.  In a l l  cases, the increase i n  re- 
ac t iv i ty  would be i n  the form of a rapid ramp increase. The ra te  of t h i s  
ramp increase i s  d i f f icul t  t o  predict because of the many different s i tu-  
ations which might be encountered. Therefore, the conservative assump- 
t i on  w i l l  be made that  the reactivity addition i s  i n  the form of a step. 
The f'urther assumption w i l l  be made that  the control system i s  ineffec- 
t i ve  because of the rapidity of the nuclear events i n  the reactor. 
The effect  on a solution type reactor of a step-increase i n  reactiv- 
i t y  is  being investigated i n  great detai l ,  both analytically and experi- 
mentally, as  part of the KEWB program (refs.  5.1, 5.2, and 5.3). Fig- 
ures 5.1 and 5.2 are theoretical estimates of the energy release and the 
maximum pressure r i s e  i n  the reactor as a function of reactor period 
taken f'rm reference 5.1. The excursions represent the result  of step- 
increases i n  reactivity (the size of the steps being such as  t o  produce 
the range of periods covered i n  the abscissa) with the reactor i n i t i a l l y  
operating a t  essentially zero power. The effects of ine r t i a l  pressure 
r i s e  have been considered. 
Inasmuch as  a very wide range of reactor shapes, solution concentra- 
tions, etc.  would be run in  the proposed NACA solution type reactor, 
these results  represent as  reasonable a f i r s t  approximation of what might 
occur as  are readily available. Most of the parameters of the above 
analyses such as radiolytic gas production rate,  gas bubble residence 
time, core heat capacity, etc.  would not vary too widely over a range of 
solution type reactors. An important parameter which can vary over a wide 
range i s  the prompt neutron mean lifetime (the thickness of the reflector 
affects  the excursion primarily through the mean lifetime). The prompt 
lifetime w i l l  affect  the reactor period produced by a given step-change 
i n  reactivity, however, for a given reactor period (the abscissa i n  f igs.  
5.1 and 5 -21, the excursion wi l l  be essentially independent of the prompt 
mean lifetime. 
The prompt neutron mean l i fet ime fo r  several typical  bare reactors 
a r e  discussed i n  section 2.3.4. The lifetimes of these reactors (10 t o  
50 psec) a re  typical  of the shortest  mean lifetimes l ike ly  t o  be encount- 
ered i n  the operation of the f a c i l i t y .  
I n  order t o  keep the  maximmu credible accident within reasonable 
bounds the following cr i te r ion  w i l l  govern a l l  loadings. No experiment 
w i l l  be run where the loading, assuming a l l  poisons, voids, e tc .  were 
accidently removed, would, produce a reactor period fa s t e r  than 5 m i l l i -  
seconds. I n  applying the above cr i ter ion,  conservative estimates of the 
prompt neutron mean lifetime w i l l  be used fo r  any part icular  loading un- 
l e s s  experimental determinations of the  l i fet ime are  available. 
I n  view of the aforesaid l imi t ,  the maximum credible step-increase 
accident would be one that put the  reactor on a 5 millisecond period. 
From figures 5.1 m d  5.2 this period would re su l t  i n  an energy release 
of about 15 megawatt seconds (about 5 x 1 0 ~ ~  f iss ions)  and a peak pressure 
r i s e  of about 50 ps i .  
The value of 15 megawatt seconds energy release seems reasonable in- 
asmuch as the observed energy release i n  excursions which have occurred 
with solution type zero power reactors is about 3 t o  5 megawatt-seconds 
(refs .  5.4 and 5.5). 
5.2.1.2 The modified start-up accident. - The maximum pumping r a t e  
of the  f i l l i n g  pump i s  4 l i t e r s  per mirate (see section 2.2 -2) .  From 
figure 2.14 it can be seen that, fo r  the most unfavorable length-diameter 
r a t i o  and for  a highly enriched solution the time required t o  
add suff icient  excess react ivi ty t o  go frdm-crit ical t o  prompt c r i t i c a l  
i s  of the order of 6 seconds (neglecting the compensating ef fec t  of 
radiolyt ic  gas formation). This i s  equivalent t o  an average reac t iv i ty  
insertion r a t e  of about 0.0012 AK/sec. This re la t ive ly  slow ra te  of re-  
ac t iv i ty  insert ion should give the  operator (who must keep a button 
pressed i n  order for  the f i l l i n g  pump t o  keep operating) time t o  take 
remedial action. There are  a t  l e a s t  f ive individual control channels 
(two period and three level )  which would act ivate  annunciators and warn- 
ing l igh t s  t o  a l e r t  the operator. The modified start-up accident should, 
therefore, never be anything more serious than a slow ramp inseration of 
reac t iv i ty  i n  which the reactor i s  very unlikely t o  reach even prompt 
c r i t i c a l .  The modified start-up accident is,  therefore, considerably 
l e s s  serious than the step-increase accident and w i l l  not be considered 
further .  
5.2.1.3 The equilibrium pressure a f t e r  the step-increase accident. - 
The equilibrium pressure i n  the reactor room a f t e r  the maximum credible 
step-increase accident was esimated by assuming that the energy gener- 
ated i n  the excursion heats the water i n  the reactor and the a i r  i n  the 
reactor romm t o  the same temperature. The maximum energy release i s  
about 15 megawatt seconds (section 5.2.1. ) ; the reactor roan a i r  volume 
i s  about 14,000 cubic feet;  the smallest reactor volume i s  about 1 7  
l i t e r s .  The temperature r i s e  of the a i r  would be about 50' F and the 
associated pressure r i s e  about 1.4 psi .  This i s  taken t o  be the equil- 
ibrium pressure a f t e r  the maximum credible accident. 
5.2.2 Containment of the maximum credible accident. - The discussion 
of the ab i l i ty  of the reactor room t o  contain the 15 megawatt-second 
- 
step-increase-accident wil l  be divided into two parts: f i r s t ,  the damage 
due t o  the excursion wi l l  be discussed and then the probable leakage from 
the room. 
5.2.2.1 Damage f r o m  the excursion. - A s  discussed i n  reference 5.2, 
shock waves i n  the f lu id  w i l l  probably not be encountered and a s  dis- 
cussed i n  section 5.2.1.1, the peak pressure of the excursion w i l l  be 
about 50 psi.  Therefore, it i s  extremely unlikely that any damage w i l l  
occur except t o  fragile equipment very near the reactor. The reactor 
vessel should be entirely unharmed and the chief mechanical effect of 
the excursion would probably by the expulsion of some fuel  solution f r o m  
the reactor tank. 
5.2.2.2 Leakage fromthe reactor room. - Inasmuch as  the excursion 
w i l l  produce no mechanical damage other than t o  equipment very near the 
reactor, it can be expected that  the leakage rate f r o m  the room for a 
given overpressure w i l l  not be affected by the excursion. The thickness 
of the reinforced-concrete walls and ceiling of the reactor room is 12 
inches; the floor is  6 inches thick. The exterior walls and roof are 
a l l  buried i n  an earth mound whose minimum thickness is 6 feet.  A l l  
penetrations of the walls of the reactor room are into the adjacent 
building except one, the ventilation system stack. A l l  penetrations 
w i l l  be carefully designed t o  be leak t ight .  The ventilation system i s  
always shut off and the ventilating system stack valve closed during re- 
actor operation. 
A maximum allowable leakage ra te  from the room of 1/2 percent per 
day for an overpressure of 1.4 ps i  wi l l  be maintained a t  a l l  times. A 
leakage ra te  of t h i s  magnitude can be measured by pressurizing the re- 
actor room and measuring the reduction i n  overpressure over a period of 
one or two days; the average a i r  temperature i n  the reactor room must be 
known t o  about lo F. This type of t e s t  wi.11 be carried out periodically. 
I f  the allowable leakage ra te  were exceeded, the reactor would not be 
permitted t o  operate un t i l  the major leaks had been detected and elimin- 
ated. The leaks could be found rather readily with standard helium or 
halide leak detectors. 
The floor of the reactor room is  covered by a metal pan and, there- 
fore, there should be no leakage t o  the ground of fuel solution which 
may have been expelled f r o m  the reactor. 
5.2.3 Radiological hazards. - The chief radiological hazard is &om 
the fission products generated by the 15 megawatt-second excursion inas- 
much as the saturated activity due to continuous operation of the reactor 
will not exceed 100 curies while the activity generated by the excursion 
will be of the order of 10,000 curies 20 minutes after the excursion. 
Since the activity is primarily due to newly generated fission products, 
the rate of decay of activity will be much greater than if the activity 
were due to saturated fission products. 
For the sake of conservatism, it will be assumed that 50 percent of 
the total activity is airborne and that it is uniformly mixed in the 
14,000 cubic feet of air in the reactor room. The activity is assumed 
to decay as time to the 1.2 power. The overpressure in the reactor room 
is assumed to be 1.4 psi and the leakage rate at this pressure is assumed 
to be 112 percent per day. . A good part of this leakage would be into the 
adjacent solution room since most of the penetrations of the reactor room 
are into the solution room. It will be assumed that 1/2 of the leakage 
is to the atmosphere; this should be a conservative estimate. For f'ur- 
ther conservatism, it will be assumed that this leakage is in the form 
of a point source at ground level. 
Inasmuch as the control room is separated from the reactor room by 
the solution room, and there would be no appreciable overpressure in the 
solution room, it is expected that the personnel in the control room 
would not receive any appreciable dose. 
As discussed in section 3.1, the distance from the reactor to the 
nearest residence is about 900 feet. Ass- a source of activity as 
described above, the atmospheric diff'usion of the fission products was 
computed using the methods of "Meteorology and Atomic Energy" (ref. 5.6 ) 
for the unfavorable weather conditions of severe inversion (n = 0.5) and 
1 meter per second wind velocity in the direction of the nearest point 
open to the public. 
The deposition dosages were computed assming a heavy rainfall 
which produces the maximum possible rainout deposition rate (ref. 5.6, 
eq. (7.21)) and lasts for 8 hours. The resulting surface source was con- 
servatively approximated by an infinite plane source with a uniform 
radioactivity concentration equlel to that of the location of interest. 
The dosage rate from this source was assumed to be 10 r/hr per 
1 curielsq meter of gamma activity and 25 mr/hr per 1 curie/sq meter of 
beta activity. 
The inhalation dose was computed by assuming that an inhalation 
dosage of 10 curie sec/cubic meter would result in an internal radiation 
dosage the equivalent of 25 r. 
The resulting integrated doses are tabulated below. 
Table 5.2. - Dosages a t  Nearest Residence ( ~ i l l i r o e n t ~ e n )  
It can be seen from table 5.2 that  the dose t o  the public i s  of the 
order of 60 milliroentgens. 
Integrated over the f i r s t  hour 
Integrated over the f i r s t  24 hours 
Transients on airport property near the reactor fac i l i ty  (see sec- 
t ion 3.1) w i l l  be warned by means of a loudspeaker i n  the event of a 
hazardous fission product release and the maximum dose should not exceed 
60 milliroentgens. 
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Administrative procedure divides into five phases as follows: 
1. Operations 
2. Safeguards 
4. Health Physics 
5. Security 
6. Uranium Accountability 
6.1 Operations 
The organizational structure of the operating section w i l l  be: 
2. Experimentalists 
The f'unction of the operating section will be to operate the criti- 
cal facility and all associated equipment, as well as to supervise 
trainees who are participating in the operation of the facility as part 
of the NACA training program. 
The scientist-in-charge will be a licensed reactor operator and all 
increases in reactivity will be made only under his personal supervision. 
Experimentalists will be scientists and technicians assigned to 
assist the scientist-in-charge. Experimentalists will be the only per- 
sonnel authorized to operate the reactor. There will be a minimum of 
two people in an operating crew. 
A nuclear safety and operating manual will be written for the com- 
pleted facility. 
6.2 Safeguards 
Safeguards w i l l  be under control of a local Safeguards Committee. 
Membership of t h i s  committee w i l l  be made up of a t  leas t  three qualified 
persons. The function of t h i s  committee w i l l  be t o  determine that  safe 
standards have been followed i n  the design of any proposed experiment, or 
of any proposed change i n  the faci l i ty .  
6 . 3  Programing 
This phase w i l l  be under the control of the Program Committee. The 
membership of t h i s  committee w i l l  be made up from delegated members of 
the branches and divisions that  w i l l  design experiments t o  be run i n  the 
faci l i ty .  The function of the committee w i l l  be t o  judge the feas ibi l i ty  
of proposed experiments and t o  schedule acceptable experiments. 
6.4 Health Physics 
Health physics ac t iv i t ies  w i l l  be t i ed  i n  with the existing health 
physics ac t iv i t i es  i n  the adjacent Materials and Stresses building. 
These existing health physics ac t iv i t ies  are related t o  the work with 
sources, which has been going on for the l a s t  seven years. Various dif- 
ferent types of sources ranging i n  size from a few millicuries t o  100 
curies have been i n  use. 
Health physics w i l l  be responsible for personnel dosimeters, pro- 
tective clothing, a i r  monitoring, and decontamination of a l l  areas. 
6.5 Security 
The fac i l i ty  w i l l  be wholly within an existing "Q1' cleared area. 
Therefore, the present guard fac i l i ty  w i l l  be adequate. Provision wil l  
be made for locking the c r i t i c a l  fac i l i ty  area during nonworking hours. 
6.6 Uranium Accountability 
Uranium accountability procedures w i l l  be established t o  meet a l l  
the requirements of the Atomic Energy Commission. 
Figure 2.1. - Zero power reactor facility plan view. 
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Figure 2.3. - Zero power reactor fac i l i ty  ventilation system. 
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Figure 2.6 - Fully enriched uranium requirements for UO2F2-Hz0 critical cylindrical 
assemblies of LID = 1. 
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Figure 2.7 - Fully enriched uranium requirements for U02F2-HzO critical 
cylindrical assemblies. 
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Figure 2.10 - Reactivity of bare U%F2-H20 cylindrical assemblies. 
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Figure 2.11 - Reactivity of water-reflected UOzF2-Hz0 cylindrical assemblies. 
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Figure 2.12 - Sensi t iv i ty  of bare c r i t i c a l  U02F2-HZO cylindrical  
assemblies t o  increment i n  core height. 
Figure 2.13 - Sensitivity of water reflected c r i t i ca l  UO2F2-Hz0 
cylindrical assemblies t o  increment i n  core height. 
Figure 2.14 - Volume required to add prompt reactivity to bare UOZFZ-RzO 
cylindrical critical assemblies. 
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Figure 2.15 - Volume required t o  add prompt r eac t iv i ty  t o  water re f lec ted  
UOZFZ-Hz0 cyl indr ica l  c r i t i c a l  assemblies. 
2 0 40 60 80 100 120 140 
C r i t i c a l  core height, Rc, cm 
Figure 2.16 - C r i t i c a l i t y  data f o r  a bare cyl indrical  core of diameter 
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Figure 2.17- - Reactor instrumentation. 
Figure 3.1. - Map showing reactor s i t e  i n  relation to  Cleveland. 
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Figure 3.4. - Plot plan Lewis Flight Propulsion Laboratory, NACA. 
Figure 3.5. - Segment of Euclid, Cleveland, and Berea quadrangles. 
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Figure 5 .1  - Variation of t o t a l  energy re -  Figure 5.2 - Variation of maxi- 
lease with period (taken from NAA-SR- mum pressure r i s e  with period 
1525). (taken from NAA-SR-1525). 
